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David J. Kalupahana, Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, has writ­
ten two books on Buddhist philosophy: Causality: The Central Philosophy of Bud­
dhism and Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis {hereafter cited as Causality 
and Philosophy, respectively). The first book, Causality, is mainly concerned with 
the doctrines of causation in early Buddhist teachings. The second, Philosophy, 
is chiefly devoted to an examination of the first phase in the history of Buddhist 
philosophy. In both works, the author commands excellent knowledge of Pali 
texts and reflects his ability to clearly set forth complex and significant ideas 
buried deep within them. His arguments are straightforward and simple in 
style, and his theories are plain, explicit, and without ambiguity, thus allowing 
easy access for the general reader.
The author demonstrates sound knowledge of Chinese as well. A few mistakes 
(e.g.t hsiangyingyin and t'ung luiyin [Causality, p. 6o] should be interchanged; 
oioaHa, pien [Causality, pp. n I, 245] should be vivatfa, ch'Ing fifc) do not prevent 
us from estimating positively his conversance in Chinese Buddhist texts. It is 
a fact that comparative studies of the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas 
have been much facilitated by the publication of the catalogues by Ancsaki and 
Akanuma1 that list the sutras contained in these two bodies of early Buddhist 
literature. Even then, it proves no easy task to find the translations correspond­
ing to a particular sutra in the Agama or the Nikkya which lay in portions other
1 Masaharu Anesaki, The Four Buddhist Agamas in Chinese (Tokyo, 1908); and Chizen 
Akanuma, 77m Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Agamas and Fili Nikdyas [fam-pa shibu 
shiagon goshSroku (Nagoya, 1929).
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than the Agama section2 of the voluminous Chinese Sutra Pifaka (e.g., Cau­
sality, p. 210, note 19).
2 The Chinese SQtra Pi taka comprises twenty-one volumes in the TaishO edition, of 
which the first two volumes are the Agama section.
For the study of early Buddhist thought, the author recognizes the importance 
of the Chinese Agamas on two points: first, to confirm the authenticity x>f some 
of the major concepts in the Pali Nikayas, and second, to throw light on some 
of the more obscure concepts found in the Pali Nikiyas (Causality, p. xi; Philos­
ophy, p. xi-xii). According to Kalupahana, the teachings of the Buddha preserved 
in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas show no significant differences 
although the theories and discussions in the Abhidharma Pifaka of the major 
schools in later times vary considerably from one another (Philosophy, p. xii; Cau­
sality, p. 147). However, we cannot always be as confident as the author isof the 
genuine nature of the Agamas and Nikiyas as the source material for early Bud­
dhist thought. We do not necessarily think they mutually agree so well as he says 
with regard to what they embody as doctrines in the whole. We know, for ex­
ample, that important passages in the Chinese version have no corresponding 
passage in the Pali, and in those cases of divergence we find more often than not 
reflections of sectarian views of the respective school in which those doctrines 
were handed down. A passage the author quotes from the Anguttara Nikaya, for 
instance, to prove that karma is defined as volition, ettand (Causality, p. 217, note 
76) gravely differs from the corresponding passage found in the Madhyama 
Agama (T 1.600a), the latter being quoted in the Abhidharmako^a to de­
fine karma in a different sense: duo karmani cotand karma cotayitod ca (Pradhan 
ed., p. 192). Another passage quoted and considered by the author to be “the 
germ of the theory of the Yogacarins stated in the Lankavatara” (Causality, p. 
121) has no corresponding passage in any part of the Chinese Agamas and its 
authenticity is denied by the Sarvastivadin scholar Sanghabhadra (T 29.733b). 
A passage quoted by Stcherbatsky from the Saipyukta Agama (T 2.91b) in 
reference to the Sarvastivadin theory of “sarvam asti” (Causality, p. 76) has no 
correspondence with any sutta of the Pali Nikayas. Thus to be “very optimistic 
about the attempt to determine the nature of pre-Abhidharma Buddhism” 
(Philosophy, p. xii), would be to completely leave out of consideration the 
problem of sectarian elements in the Theravada Nikayas, in the Sarvastivadin 
Sarpyukta and Madhyama Agamas, as well as the other Agamas in Chinese 
belonging to yet undetermined sectarian lines.
In both books, one of the author’s conclusions is that empiricism is the basis 
of early Buddhist epistemology (Causality, p. 199; Philosophy, p. 24); that is, the 
Buddha confined himself to that which is empirically given, rejecting an Abso­
lute or a transempirical reality (Causality, p. 185). For the Buddha “everything”
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consists of the six senses and their corresponding six objects, other things being 
beyond the sphere of experience (Philosophy, pp. 23-24). The conception of 
nirvana, therefore, is to be examined solely in terms of its empirical aspect 
{Philosophy, p. 69). Nirvana is, the author argues, a state of perfect mental health, 
of perfect happiness, calmness or coolness, attained in this life, or while one is 
alive (Causality, p. 180). The argument is convincing in itself, but questions still 
remain: first, why the two aspects of nirvana, sa-up&iisesa and an-up&hsesa, are 
differentiated; and, second, what the significance of the term parinirvana 
(“nirvana attained with death,” Philosophy, p. 71) is? The author’s explanation 
on these points with reference to the distinction between nirvana and saflMvedayi- 
tanirodha, “the state of cessation of perception and feeling” (Philosophy, p. 74/.), 
leaves something to be desired.
Regarding the theory of causality, the author refers to the synonymous usage 
of the terms hetu and pratyaya in early Buddhist literature (Causality, p. f). 
Here he points out that it was the Sarvastivadin school that first distinguished 
between hetu and pratyaya as causes and conditions, or as chief causes and sub­
causes. This, however, is not quite true. For the Sarvastivadins as well, they are 
synonymous: both sixfold hetu and fourfold pratyaya in SarvastivAdin theory 
cover the same totality of causes. The difference is simply in terms of classifica­
tion—when causes are divided into six they make sixfold hetu, when divided into 
four, fourfold pratyaya. The quotation in the Abhidharmako&i from the 
Sarpvukta Agama (tathd cakyur bhikyo hetu rupapi pratyayal cakfurvijhdnasyotpdddya) 
is mentioned by the author as evidence of a distinction between hetu and pratyaya 
(Causality, p. 61). He seems quite right in view of the corresponding passage in 
Pali: cakkhuH ca paficca rUpe ca uppajjati cakkhumM6t\arp He overlooks, however, 
the sentence just succeeding the quotation in the Abhidharmakoia (Pradhan 
ed., p. 464) : ye hi hetaoo ye pratyayd vijhanasyotpddaya to 'pyamty&h This is more or 
less consistent with what is found in the Pali Saipyutta Nikiya: jo pi hetuyo pi 
paccayo vihUdnassa uppdddya so pi anicco (S 2.23). What distinction is there here 
between hetu and pratyaya?
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